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Summary findings
How tightly  are trade negotiators held to winning a  Negotiations were widely perceived to involve "equal
dollar of concession for each dollar of concession  sacrifice for the common good," with all countries
granted? The outcome of the Uruguay Round tariff  expected to cut tariffs on the same percentage of
negotiations suggests that such constraints were not tight.  imports.
None of the delegations interviewed by Finger,  Ability to pay was also a consideration: a smaller
Reincke, and Castro had tried to calculate for themselves  fraction of imports wsas  liberalized for developing
the extent of concessions received. And the surplus or  countries.
deficit of concessions received (over concessions given)  The authors found a tendency toward equality (in
varied widely among countries.  percentage of imports affected) across participating
Measuring the "percentage point dollar" of  countries'  concessions, particularly when developing
concessions given and received (a "percentage point  countries'  unilateral liberalization was considered -
dollar" being a reduction of the tariff by one percentage  including the part of it that was not bound at the
point on SI of imports, or by trading partners on  Uruguay Round.
exports), they found that the outcome of negotiations  Delegations emphasized how important it was for
varied enormously from one country to another.  them to look after the interests of politically important
For 13 of 27 countries, net concessions (positive or  sectors (including rice for Japan and the Republic of
negative) were at least 75 percent of the size of  Korea and textiles for the United States and the
concessions received.  European Union).
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Economists  widely  agree  that unilateral  free trade augments  the national
economic  interest. Economists  perhaps  even more  widely  accept  that bargaining  at the
GATT  rounds  has been motivated  and controlled  by reciprocity  -- each government  treats
its trade restrictions  as assets and will reduce  them only in exchange  for equivalent
reductions  by trading  partners. This presumption,  that trade liberalization  through  the
GATT  is built on reciprocity,  seems  to be an even  more solid part of economists'  folklore
than  is a preference  for free trade.
This study will explore  market access  bargaining  -- particularly  tariff bargaining  -
- at the Uruguay  Round. There are two general  objectives:
1.  To measure  the extent of country  participation  in market  access bargaining  -- the
degree  to which  countries  agreed  to reciprocal  liberalization  or to bind under the
GATT/WTO  otherwise  unilateral  liberalization.
2.  To analyze  the basis of the success  in market  access  bargaining  that was achieved  at
the round. Was the successful  outcome  attributable  to a rigid adherence  to reciprocity
in bargaining  -- a dollar of concessions  received  by each party for each dollar of
concession  given? Or is this success  the result of a more  relaxed view of reciprocity;
one that recognizes  other  reasons  to agree  to reduce  tariffs,  such as the contribution  of
individual  liberalizations  to constructing  an international  system within which  all may
prosper  -- or even the domestic  gains  that liberalization  brings?
The following  section  explores  several  hypotheses  or models  that might explain
the motives  and disciplines  that propel and control  tariff bargaining  at GATT
negotiations. The next sections  explain  how  we have measured  tariff concessions  given
and received  at the Uruguay  Round,  then use these  findings  to evaluate  the relevance  of
the various  models  that we have advanced  to explain  tariff negotiations. The final
section  provides  our conclusions.HYPOTHESES  ABOUT  THE NATURE  OF BARGAINING
What do trade negotiators do, what motivates them (i.e., what are they out to
achieve) and how do they score their successes and failures?
Analytically speaking one can identify two basic models that explain the
motivation and the structure of a country's participation in multilateral market access
negotiations. The two models, which we label the "mercantilist bargaining model" and
the "common good" model are described below.  The models need not be mutually
exclusive -- reality may involve aspects of both of them.  In this spirit, the models will be
used to interpret the measured results of the Uruguay Round tariff bargaining.
The mercantilist bargaining model
What you get is what you payfor.  The mercantilist bargaining model, to
economists, is the obvious model.  Trade negotiators ( at least those who conduct the
market access negotiations, the subject of this paper) bargain over market access -- to
gain a reduction of other countries' tariffs at the cost of a reduction of ones own. Ernest
Preeg (pp. 27, 28) explaining why a multi-sector negotiated approach to liberalization is
rnore effective than unilateral liberal or sector-specific negotiations:
Governments [in the latter case] confront sharply focused political
opposition that can best be neutralized by counterbalancing gains for
particular export industries in other sectors.  The overall "gains from
trade" for consumers unfortunately lack political force.  A balance of
specific "benefits" and "concessions" thus constitutes the political basis
for the comprehensive approach for trade negotiations."
Paul Krugman (p. 114) is even more direct:
Anyone who has tried to make sense of international trade negotiations
eventually realizes that they can only be understood by realizing that they
are a game scored according to mercantilist rules, in which an increase in
exports ... is a victory, and an increase in imports ... is a defeat.  The
implicit mercantilist theory that underlies trade negotiations does not
make sense on any level ... but it nonetheless governs actual policy.
Likewise, Gilbert Winham, (p. 62) in his analysis of the Kennedy Round, notes
that "the principle of reciprocity is a determinant of bargaining behavior."  This principle
"leads negotiators to develop certain procedures and measures for evaluating the progress
of a negotiation ... [f]or  example, 'duty reduction' and 'volume of imports,'  ... [that] no
doubt make trade bargaining easier, but do not make much sense in economic terms."
Though the Kennedy Round was a multilateral negotiation which (formally)
applied an across-the-board tariff cutting formula rather than item-by-item bargaining,
Winham observes (pp. 64-65) that "participants quickly found that meaningful
2concessions usually could be given only between the principal supplier of individual
goods and the major importers."
Within this model, what you get is what you pay for.  It treats market access
bargaining as an application of the straightforward mercantilist calculus that measures
gaining access to foreign markets as a benefit, giving up access to the domestic market as
a cost.'
Complications to the mercantilist bargaining model
There are two basic sources of complications, the possibility of non-economic
objectives, and the frictions that might occur in balancing of the interests of industries
that will gain (export industries) versus those that will lose (import-competing industries)
in the reciprocal bargaining of market access.
Non-economic  objectives
War, according to Clausewitz, is the pursuit of diplomacy through other means.
Often, so is trade policy.  While the mercantilist bargaining model describes well the
commercial interests that pressure government policy, the government may itself have
other -- non-economic -- objectives. After World War I, a number of leaders saw freedom
of commerce as an important instrument for maintaining world peace.  Freedom of
international commerce was the third of US President Wilson's Fourteen Points.  To
Cordell Hull, secretary of state for President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the link was
straightforward, "[U]nhampered trade dovetailed with peace; high tariffs, trade barriers
and unfair economic competition with war." (Hull, p. 81)
Likewise, after World War II leadership in Europe and in the United States saw
economic union in Europe and the construction of an open global trading system perhaps
more as strategic objectives than as economic ones. Their view of the good of such
arrangements paid more attention to the prevention of future wars than to the dollars and
cents calculations of efficiency or welfare gains that economists are conditioned to
interpret as gains.
The presence of such non-economic objectives need not however discredit the
mercantilist bargaining model of the negotiating process.  To leaders motivated by such
objectives, reciprocal bargaining is a tactic by which they can move toward their
A variant of the reciprocal bargaining model that is relevant to developing countries that have unilaterally
liberalized focuses on binding such liberalization internationally as defense against later backsliding.
Against pressures for new import restrictions the government can respond that to do so would violate
an international commitment. If further pressed, the government can mobilize export interests by
pointing out that under the international agreement, unauthorized import restrictions can lead to
authorized retaliation by trading partners.
3objective. The reduction  of trade  barriers  -- by whatever  process and without  regard to
the motives  of the interests  that support  the process  -- moves  them toward  their objective.
Indeed,  a government  that can mobilize  non-economic  motives  into significant  support
for trade  liberalization  will be in a position  to play a hegemonic  role (as the US did) and
give  up larger concessions  that it receives  in exchange.
frictions,  transferrng  national gains to national losers
For a government  motivated  toward  trade liberalization,  the deciding  trade-offs
are not between  it and foreign  governments,  but between  domestic  winners and losers --
between  exporting  and import-competing  domestic  industries.  The bargaining  process
ties access to foreign  markets  to the granting  of access  to the domestic  market,  and
thereby  mobilizes  export interests  to favor  import  liberalization.  In the US political
process, an important  application  of the leverage  export  interests  provide  is in the passage
of legislation  that grants the President  the authority  to negotiate  -- that grants  him the
legal authority  to reduce US tariffs.
Overcoming  resistance  from import-competing  industries  has been, in practice,
part power  --using export industries  to win more  congressional  votes than the opposition
could  rally -- and part compensation.  Adjustment  assistance,  which in 1980  dispensed
$1.6  billion  to import-competing  industries  and workers  is the best example  of
compensation,  though  public  works  and other  programs  that would  be more literally
described  as bribery  than as compensation  have also been  used. 2
Another  way in which  governments  attempt  to minimize  the problem  of
compensating  losers is by taking  advantage  of the large volume  of intra-industry  trade
that characterizes  the modern  trading  system. To the extent  that concessions  given  by an
industry  can be offset  by concessions  received  on the products  exported  by the same
industry,  the government  need not develop  inter-industry  mechanisms  for balancing
losers against  winners. Gilbert  Winham  reports (p. 65) that during the Kennedy  Round
there evolved  a tendency  to look for such  "self-balancing  sectors." From a political
standpoint  this informal  negotiating  practice would  be practical  as it would  reduce  the
need for cross-industry  compensation  mechanisms.
Taking  into account  that the politics of negotiations  across industries  will require
cross-industry  compensation  mechanisms  -- and that  these mechanisms  will not be
frictionless  -- does not change  the basic mercantilist  metric of the reciprocal  bargaining
model. It does, however,  suggest  that  -- other factors  given -- a country's concessions
given and concessions  received  will tend  toward  industries  where  intra-industry  trade  is
large.
2Zeller  provides  examples  of the trades  President  John F. Kennedy  made to win Congressional  approval  of
the Trade  Expansion  Act of 1962,  which  gave  him the authority  to negotiate  in what came  to be called
the Kennedy  Round.
4A variant of the reciprocal bargaining model that is relevant to developing
countries that have unilaterally liberalized focuses on binding such liberalization
internationally as defense against later backsliding.  Against pressures for new import
restrictions the government can respond that to do so would violate an international
commitment. If further pressed, the government can mobilize export interests by
pointing out that under the international agreement, unauthorized import restrictions can
lead to authorized retaliation by trading partners.
The common  good model
Individual sacrifice for the common good. Many of the participants in the initial
ITO and GATT negotiations viewed their task as the construction of a system, from
which all countries would derive significant non-economic benefits -- perhaps economic
benefits also, but the emphasis was usually on non economic benefits.  The model differs
from the mercantilist bargaining model in that the benefits a participant gets are not
unequivocally identified with the particular market access concessions that the country
receives -- the link between contribution and benefit is  amorphous, resulting from the
from the collective nature of the system rather than from any particular element of it..
Within the mercantilist bargaining model, the appropriate yardstick for an
individual country's success in the negotiations would be the excess of its concessions
conceived over its concessions given. The common good model focuses not on the
successes of individual countries, but on the success of the group.  Within this model,
success would be gauged in a collective way, e.g., by overall reduction of trade
restrictions, and fairness by comparing the contributions of countries to the system -- e.g.,
concessions given by one country compared with concessions given by other countries.
This model, in which negotiators see their activity as reaching agreement to
accept individual sacrifice for the common good, describes well the situation in which the
shared objective is non-economic, such as creating a web of economic activity, interests
and enterprises that spans international borders so as to minimize the likelihood of armed
conflict. It underlies several insightful analyses of previous rounds, such as Robert
Hudec's analysis (1987) of the position of developing countries in the GATT system.
Hudec's focus is to explain how GATT members came to accept "special and differential
treatment" as the appropriate attitude toward developing countries.  In constructing any
system out of the contributions of its members, it is difficult to ask the less well off
members to contribute proportionally with the better off members.
LESSONS FROM EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS
Experimental economics has paid considerable attention to bargaining
experiments, thus this literature can offer insights into a better understanding of both the
negotiating process and the likely outcomes of international trade negotiations. In the
5experimental bargaining context, bargaining structures (institutions) and bargaining or
market interactions turn out to be key elements in determining possible outcomes.
In simple bilateral bargaining games researchers have found 50/50 splits to be
more the rule than the exception (Davis and Holt, 1993). This is true even when the
bargaining is structured so that one of the subjects has the opportunity to capture all of
the prize that is at stake. In situations 3 in which one party (called the "controller") enjoys
the power to decide how the outcome will be allocated, these controllers recurrently fail
to exploit their full bargaining position and accept an equal split. It is interesting to
notice, however,  that this "benevolent" behavior tends to occur more often in cases
where the property rights are randomly assigned (as with the toss of a coin). If the party
in control (the one making the offer) feels that he has "earned the right" of being the
controller, then the incidence of an equal split offer tends to be reduced.
The  important lesson from those bargaining experiments is that there is
something more than  individual payoff maximization in explaining behavior (and the
realized outcomes). The idea of  fairness plays an important role in the outcomes.
Players often will not exploit their advantage and claim the entire reward unless the
bargaining situation is structured so as to provide a sense that they have earned this
reward, i.e., a reason to think that it is reasonable and fair to do so.  Benevolent
controllers may be motivated by the fear of rejection of "unreasonable" proposals, or they
may be concerned with the opinion of outsiders. But even in cases in which the controller
is given dictatorial power -- the other party cannot refuse the outcome that the controller
specifies --.experimenters have observed that controllers do not necessarily claim all of
the prize for themselves. (Other things equal, controllers in a dictatorial position do tend
to take a larger share than in cases in which the other party can refuse to accept, or block
the game.)
Why, however, would a dictator be reluctant to maximize his own payoff? An
attempt to answer this question looked at the case where every action and decision were
absolutely anonymous so that no one would know who made which decision -- not even
the person who designed and ran the experiment. In this experiment dictators
dramatically increased their share of the prize, taking all of it in more than 60 percent of
the trials.  From these results, the experimenters conclude that opinions of outsiders do
influence bargaining behavior, more so than the payoffs available to other players
(Hoffman et al, 1991).
In conclusion, the findings of experimental economics suggest that the idea of
fairness will be important to outcomes in a bargaining situation such as bilateral or
multilateral trade negotiations. Public exposure matters, perhaps more than an abstract
sense of fairness. A party in a strong bargaining position is less inclined to exploit that
power when it will be evident to all participants that the stronger party has more or less
dictated the outcome; i.e., when he senses that a relevant peer group might not approve.
3Well  defined  property  rights  are another  property  of these  games.
6However, when the process provides the party in the stronger position a sense of having
earned that position, there is a notably increased tendency to exploit it.
CONVERSATIONS  WITH  NEGOTIATORS
Examining quantitatively the balance of concessions given and received is one
way to evaluate hypotheses about delegations' objectives and standards.  It is also
possible to evaluate such hypotheses by asking delegations how they negotiated and how
they evaluated and presented the outcome they achieved.  Such conversations were held
in September, 1994, after the Uruguay Round Agreements had been signed in Marrakech
on April 15, 1997. These conversations brought out several related points:
*  Powerful constituencies had to be accommodated.
*  Selling the agreement at home. i.e., gaining approval, was an important consideration,
particularly in the last months when the negotiations were being mopped up.
*  A sense of fairness, of appropriate contribution, was an important concept.
Accommodating  constituencies  and selling  the agreement  at home
The first two points are perhaps obvious, but their weight on how delegations
evaluated the outcome of the negotiations needs a word of explanation.  From our
conversations we developed the impression that satisfying powerful constituencies was
much more important than any evaluation of the overall balance of concessions received
versus concessions given.  Because of the obvious need to gain governmental approval
(implementation) for any agreement reached, delegations sought to avoid calling
attention to concessions given. Evaluation tended to be across general issue areas
(TRIPs, antidumping, dispute settlement) and in areas in which a delegation accepted
losses (i.e., areas in which the outcome was opposed at home) the delegation's
presentations tended to emphasize what was gained on other items within the issue area
and how the final agreement on the losing issue was better than other alternatives that
had been on the table.  The tendency was to present everything as a victory, nothing as a
concession given.
No delegation of the ten with whom we spoke mentioned having tallied
concessions received versus concessions made, either within the tariff access negotiations
or across the span of the Uruguay Round agreements. One delegation did comment that
SELA had provided useful tabulations of concessions tabled by trading partners of the
South American and Caribbean countries.
Several delegations explained that their governments, internally, did recognize the
irrelevance of a mercantilist toting up and saw the round as an instrument of their
domestic reforms.  But even they, in selling the round domestically, found it useful to
make certain mercantilist points.  For them, the mercantilism of the process was
somewhat more for appearance sake than for substance -- the domestic politics of the
situation rather than the international politics.  The more however that client oriented
7domestic politics was the determnining  characteristic of a delegation's behavior, the more
was that delegation's evaluation in substance mercantilist.  But even delegations whose
evaluations were substantially mercantilist in concept made no attempt at a formal
tallying up of overall domestic benefits versus domestic costs.  (As already noted, there
was considerable reluctance to present anything as a cost.)  No delegation was aware of
any calculation of concessions received such as we have presented here.
As to how powerful constituencies were assuaged, there seem to have been many
ways. The US delegation, for example, under pressure from the US textile industry,
negotiated hard to extract concessions on fibers and fabrics from major exporters of
apparel.  In other cases, a powerful domestic constituency was honored by the delegation
holding out until the deadline before accepting an agreement that gave less than what the
constituency wanted.  The Korean delegation, for example, to emphasize that what was
given was the minimum that could be given, did not concede on a commitment to
increase its imports of rice until the final moments before the deadline for completing the
round.
Achieving appropriate contributions from all
Particularly in the last month of the negotiations (the mopping up) the tariff
negotiations devoted significant attention to ensuring that each participating country had
made an appropriate contribution to the tariff reduction exercise.  Delegations widely but
informnally  accepted that the target for industrial countries was an average reduction of
one-third, for developing countries an average reduction of one-fourth.4 Achieving these
targets intertwined with how countries would receive "credit" for unilateral tariff
reductions and for extensions of bindings that did not imply tariff cuts.  It was also
influenced by the fact that founding the World Trade Organization was one of the
Uruguay Round agreements.
No specification fQr  measuring "officially" how much a county had reduced its
tariffs was ever agreed or for that matter, even debated.  The Punta del Este Declaration'
(Part I.G) mandated that the Group of Negotiations on Goods
4 At the July 7-9, 1993,  G-7 summit  in Tokyo,  the Quadrilateral  Trade  Ministers  announced  a substantial
market  access  agreement  plus their goals  for what they hoped  to achieve  overall:
*  selected  products;  reductions  to zero or harmonization  at low levels,
*  tariffs 15 percent  and above;  50 percent  reduction,  subject  to certain  exceptions  and similar
reductions  by other  exporting  counties,
*  other  tariffs;  negotiated  reduction  by an average  of at least one-third.
The one-third reduction for industrial countries may thus have come from this agreement, but we
have  not identified  the origin  of the one-fourth  target cut for developing  countries.
5 The Punta del Este Declaration,  formally  titled, "Ministerial  Declaration  on the Uruguay  Round,"  was
published in GATT Focus, No. 41, October 1986.
8conduct an evaluation of the results obtained ... in terms of the Objectives
and the General Principles Governing Negotiations,
but the relevant objectives and general principles (Part I.D. - Tariffs) establish only
broad targets for the tariff negotiations:
to reduce or, as appropriate, eliminate tariffs including the reduction or
elimination of high tariffs and tariff escalation.  Emphasis shall be given to
the expansion of the scope of tariff concessions among all participants.
According to delegations the informal practice was more or less to evaluate from
6 applied rates in 1986 to the bound rate agreed at the Uruguay Round.  By this practice,
countries which had, after 1986, unilaterally reduced their tariffs would be given "credit"
at the round to the extent that they bound these cuts at the round.  No delegation that we
interviewed had actually performed such calculations.
For how to take into account bindings that did not imply tariff cuts, e.g., ceiling
bindings, not even an unofficial approach evolved. Toward the end of 1990, the Mexican
delegation circulated a non-paper  that argued that credit be given for expansions of the
scope of bindings, but did not offer a method for measuring its "tariff cut equivalent."
Later, the chairman of the Market Access Group provided guidelines for such
measurement, including a matrix of suggested equivalents between depth of tariff cut and
scope of expansion of bindings.  The view of the negotiators with whom we spoke is that
these guidelines were not followed -- there never emerged even notional agreement on
how to convert extension of bindings into a  tariff cut equivalent.
Though Canada's proposal in April 1990 to create a World Trade Organization
was slow to win support (Preeg, p. 114) by the time the negotiations were coming to a
close the general sense of agreement that the WTO proposal would be approved did
influence the outcome of the tariff negotiations.  In the informal tallying up, negotiators
informed us, delegations were reluctant not to accept a country's  tariff offer that seemed
a few percentage points short of the unofficial targets of one-third reduction by the
industrial or one-fourth reduction by the developing countries.  To do so would prevent
the country from being a charter member of the WTO -- leave the country out of the new
institution that was being created.  In such cases, notice was taken of extension of ceiling
bindings, i.e., the extension of ceiling bindings provided a pretext to accept an offer that
countries were, for other reasons, inclined to accept.
6 The tariffication of NTBs on agricultural products used the 1986-88 average of their tariff equivalent as
the target, but the target was not binding.
7 In GATTIWTO usage, a non-paper is a way to circulate an idea for discussion without proposing that the
idea be adopted -- a way to advance preliminary discussion. The non-paper was co-sponsored by 19
other developing countries.
9The exercise in achieving appropriate contributions from all parties allows several
generalizations about the negotiating process.  First, there were obvious trade-offs from
one part of the negotiations to another and the all-or-nothing character of the WTO
proposal required that a country accept the disciplines of all the agreements if it became a
WTO member.  In contrast, a country could choose not to accept any or all of the Tokyo
Round codes and still remain a full member of the GATT.  Accepting all of these
disciplines could reasonably be interpreted by trading partners as worth as much as
another percentage point coverage of tariff reduction. 8
DATA AND MEASUREMENTS
Our basic data source was the Integrated Data Base (IDB)9 that is maintained by
the Secretariat of the WTO. The IDB covers all industrial and transition economies that
participated in the Uruguay Round, plus twenty-six of ninety-four developing economy
participants.  Complete data for the calculations described below were available for 33
countries and the European Unionl'.
There is no "official" measure of the tariff reductions exchanged at the Round.
Strictly speaking, each country agreed to bind its tariff rates at the levels notified -- the
levels reported in series MFN09F of the IDB. Legally speaking, the exchange that was
consummated was this exchange of bindings.'1 We have developed three different
measures of the tariff cuts that were implicitly agreed, the reciprocal reduction, the bound
reduction and the total reduction.  Each of these is explained below.
The tariff reductions we report below are averages of changes, not changes of
averages. The various changes were calculated tariff line by tariff line, then aggregated
by country into averages, weighted by own imports that enter at MFN rates.12 The
changes cover only reductions of MFN tariffs, they do not include the tariff equivalent of
the agreed elimination of the MFA, nor do they include the agreed tariffication of NTBs
on agricultural products and the agreed reduction of these tariff equivalents. Average
applied rates cover all tariff lines but average bound rates cover only those tariff lines
that are bound, post Uruguay Round.
8 The experience shows that there are always fudge factors available. In this case, the treatment of
bindings, that could be used as cover for a decision made for other reasons.
9.  The IDB includes countries that account for 100 recent of non-petroleum imports of North America,
Western Europe and WTO members (at the time of the Uruguay Round) in Central and Eastern
Europe.  The IDB covers 90 percent of Asia's non-petroleum imports, 80 percent of Latin America's
non-petroleum imports, but only two sub-Saharan African countries (Senegal and Zimbabwe) who
together account for 30 percent of sub-Saharan Africa's non-petroleum imports.
10  Finger, Ingco and Reincke explain in more detail the IDB and the data it contains.
Some of these bindings -- where the MFN09F rate was below the applied rate -- implied tariff
reductions.  Some did not. For many developing country tariff lines, the MFN09F rates were above
applied rates.
12 Imports from free trade area or customs union partners were not included in the weights.
10Reciprocal  reduction
The calculations  labeled  "reciprocal  reduction"  were intended  to measure
reductions  agreed  at the Uruguay  Round  and to exclude  the unilateral  reductions  that
were,  by accident  of timing,  introduced  during  the round,' 3 i.e., to cover strictly
reductions  conditioned  on reciprocal  reductions  by trading  partners
A number  of countries  introduced  substantial  unilateral  reductions  of their tariff
rates during  the years of the Uruguay  Round. Where  these unilateral  changes  were
reflected  in the IDB MFN applied  rate (MFN03),  we used these rates as the "before"' 4
rates to calculate  the reciprocal  reductions.  Where  the MFN03  rates did not reflect  the
unilateral  reductions  we used 1992  applied  rates from the TRAINS  data base. The
"after"  rate for this calculation  we took to be the minimum  of the Uruguay  Round  final
offer rate'5 (MFN09F)  and the "before"  rate. Thus we counted as reciprocal  reductions
only those  instances  in which  the binding  was a commitment  to reduce the post
unilateral-liberalization  applied  rate.
Total  reduction
The "total  reduction"  measures  the overall  tariff reduction  from "before"  the
Uruguay  Round,  chronologically  speaking,  to the "after"  Uruguay  Round  rate, again
chronologically  speaking. The "after"  rate for this calculation  is the same as that used to
calculate  reciprocal  reductions  -- the lower  of the post Uruguay  Round  bound rate or the
rate that  resulted  from unilateral  liberalization.  The before  rate is the Uruguay  Round
applied  rate for 1986,  as provided  by the IDB.
Bound  reduction
The "before"  rates  for the calculations  labeled  "bound  reduction"  are the same  as
the "before"  rates  for the "total  reduction." The "after"  rates are the post Uruguay
Round  bound  rates.
3  By the samne  token,  we did not include  tariff  changes  resulting  from regional  integration  that took  place
during  the round;  e.g., the formation  of NAFrA; Austria,  Finland  and Sweden  joining the European
Union.
14  "Before,"  of course,  relates  here to cause,  not to chronology.
15  The Uruguay  Round  agreement  allows  for year-by-year  staged  introduction  of tariff reductions.
Generally,  the MFN  final offer rates will  be effective  no later  than  January 1, 1999,  but some
countries  have,  for some  commodities,  negotiated  later  deadlines. The MFN09F  rates are the final
rates -- after all stages are completed.
11Comparing  the three  concepts
Simplistically  speaking,  we have for each tariff  line for each country,  three tariff
rates:
*  A: the 1986  MFN applied  rate,
*  B: the 1992  MFN applied  rate,
*  C: the post Uruguay  Round  bound  rate.
The changes  then are defined  as follows:
*  Total Reduction:  from A to the smaller  of B or C.
*  Bound  Reduction:  from A to C.
*  Reciprocal  Reduction:  from B to the smaller  of B or C.
Please  note that the bound  reduction  and the reciprocal  reduction  do not add up to
the total reduction.
Concessions  received
The second  and perhaps  the motivating  side of the negotiations  coin is
concessions  received. In addition  to tabulating  concessions  given by each participant,  we
will also tabulate  concessions  received. Just as concessions  given are measured  by the
depth of cut and the value of imports  on which a country  agrees to reduce its tariffs,
concessions  received  are measured  by the depth  of cut of trading  partners' cuts on
products  that a country  exports,  and the value of exports  to those countries.
Arithmetically,  once concessions  given  are calculated,  by tariff line; for each country  as
an importer,  concessions  received  can be tabulated  for any country  by aggregating  over
the imports  of all other countries  from the subject  country. 16
MEASUREMENT  OF PARTICIPATION  IN  THE  TARIFF  NEGOTIATIONS
One of the objectives of the study is to document the countries' participation in
the Uruguay Round.  From tariff line information recorded by the GATT/WTO
Secretariat, we will tabulate the extent to which countries agreed at the Round to reduce
and to bind their import restrictions.  Reductions and bindings by countries will be
compared, as will be resulting levels of import restrictions and of bindings.
The second side of the negotiations coin is concessions received.  In addition to
tabulating concessions given by each participant, we will also tabulate concessions
received.  (Just as concessions given are measured by the value of imports on which a
country agrees to reduce its tariffs, concessions received are measured by the value of a
country's exports on which a trading partner reduces its import restrictions.)
6 Concessions  given are tabulated  only  over  imports  from other  countries  included  in the sample. Thus
our measures  cover concessions  given only  to other  countries  in the sample,  concessions  received
only from other  countries  in the sample.
12TARIFF CONCESSIONS  GIVEN: THE COMMON  GOOD  HYPOTHESIS
The common good hypothesis has a straightforward empirical implication: that
countries will reduce tariffs by more or less the same amount.  GATT's history of special
and differential treatment for developing countries suggests that this proposition will be
modified by a mercantilist "ability to pay" equity consideration, so that developing
countries will be expected to make smaller reductions than industrial countries.
Reciprocal  concessions
The size of reciprocal concessions given by selected countries are given in Table
1. The first column follows normal GATT usage and measures the change as a
percentage of the initial ad valorem or ad valorem equivalent tariff level.  The second
column measures the tariff reduction as the change divided by unity plus the ad valorem
tariff rate.  For many purposes this a more economically meaningful measure of the
impact of the tariff cut than the percentage change of the ad valorem rate.  For a small
country, one whose imports do not affect world prices, dT/(l+T)  measures the percentage
by which the domestic price of the imported product will decline as a result of the tariff
cut. If the concern is market access, it would be inappropriate, for example, to treat the
halving of a 2 percent tariff as equivalent to the halving of a 50 percent tariff.  The latter
change would allow a 20 percent improvement of the (after tariff) price the importer
receives, the former a less than one percent improvement -- as dT/(l+T)  measures.
The common good model implies that countries will be expected to make equal
contributions or sacrifices, perhaps modified by some accepted ability-to-pay-criterion.
At the Uruguay Round, ability to pay was reflected in the informal criterion that
industrial countries reduce their tariffs overall by one-third, developing countries by 1/4.
To incorporate this criterion, we scaled each country's tariff reduction by the targets --
33.3 percent reduction for industrial countries, 25 percent for developing countries.
(Thus an industrial country that reduced its tariff by an average of 33.3 percent or a
developing country that reduced its tariff by 25 percent would have an index value of
100.)
The data do not support the hypothesis that countries would be induced to make
uniform reductions.  As a test of the common contribution hypothesis, the most striking
property of the results reported in Table 1 is the lack of uniformity in contributions.  As a
percentage of the target contributions of a 1/3 reduction by the industrial countries and a
1/4 reductions for the developing countries, the actual figures for reciprocal reductions
range from zero percent to 170 percent.  (Column c).  In the following section we will
look into the possibility that the target criteria applied to the bound or the total reductions
rather than to the reciprocal reductions.
13Total and bound concessions
Table 2 compares the uniformity of reciprocal, bound and total tariff reductions
given at the Uruguay Round.  As there was informal agreement at the round to grant
credit for tariff reductions that had been made unilaterally but were now bound under the
GATT/WTO, we would expect that countries would measure their contributions to the
common goods by the metric of bound concessions rather than concessions whose
reduction was narrowly conditioned on the Uruguay Round negotiations.
Results reported in Table 2 show that this was indeed the case.  The coefficient of
variation of tariff reductions'7 across all countries falls by one half when we move from
reciprocal cuts to bound cuts --for developing countries, it falls by two thirds.  It seems
evident then that the binding of unilateral tariff reductions was treated at the round as an
action of substantial value.
Table 3 shows that the same result applies when we measure the tariff reductions
by the formula dT/(l+T).  Again the coefficient of variation is much lower for bound
reductions than for reciprocal reductions.  Again, the reduced variation is mostly among
the developing countries.
What then can we conclude from our examination of the "equal contributions to
the common good" hypothesis?
The most dramatic finding is the lack of uniformity across countries in the depth of
concessions given.
In evaluating this lack of uniformity, we should of course remember that the tariff
were only a part of the negotiations.  There were fourteen other negotiating groups, hence
what a country gave or did not give in the tariff negotiations may reflect what the country
received or did not receive in the other negotiations.  The other negotiations were
however mainly about rules (antidumping, dispute settlement, etc.) in which the outcome
for one country was the same as for another. While there might be reason for different
countries to evaluate differently the value of such an outcome, that evaluation should
have been more or less the same among similar groups of countries, e.g., among the
industrial countries or among the developing countries.
We do not find uniformity even among groups. Excluding Hong Kong, whose
free trade policies leave her no tariffs reductions to contribute, bound cuts among the
industrial countries still range from about two-thirds of the 33.3 percent target to over
200 percent.  Likewise, among developing countries, bound cuts for a number of
countries were less than half of the target 25 percent cut, for other developing countries
bound cuts were well over 100 percent of the target -- for Korea, over twice the target.
17 The standard deviation divided by the mean.
14While many delegations informed us that there was a shared concern that all
negotiating countries contribute equally (or equitably), loyalty to this concern seems to
have been more notional than rigorous.  There was minimal policing of the standard, no
official tabulation of depth of cut by country, and from what we learned from
delegations, minimal informal tabulation.
Binding unilateral concessions did seem to count in the round.  When we take these
liberalizations into account along with cuts tied to reciprocal cuts agreed at the round, the
contributions across countries are considerably more uniform.
CONCESSIONS  RECEIVED  VERSUS CONCESSIONS  GIVEN: THE MERCANTILIST
BARGAINING  HYPOTHESIS
The view of tariff bargaining most familiar to economists focuses not on the
amount of concessions that a country gives but on the net of concessions received over
concessions given.  According to this model the objective of each negotiator is to gain a
net advantage, or "profit," but the negotiating or competitive process pushes the level of
profits toward zero. We should expect therefore that for each country the net of
concessions received over given will be close to zero. 8
To evaluate this hypothesis, we tabulated the amount of concessions received by
each of the countries in our sample, then the net of concessions given over concessions
received.1 9 In the first three columns of Table 4 we compare the depth of tariff cut
received and given for each country in our sample.  (The cuts are calculated according to
the more economically sensible measure dT/{  1+T}.) It is obvious that the net cuts are
not uniform over countries.  India agreed (reciprocal cut) to reduce its tariff by about 6
percent, in exchange for a slightly larger than 1 percent cut by trading partners on India's
exports.  Hong Kong, on the other hand, had no tariffs to cut, but received an average cut
of almost 21/2  percent on its exports.  Because the economically sensible formula
dT/(I+T) assigns higher values to cuts in higher tariffs than does the formula dTIT, those
higher tariff countries that made substantial cuts generally tended to have negative
balances.
The second fourth, fifth and sixth columns of Table 4 take into account not only
the depth of tariff cuts but also the value of exports or imports on which the cut applies --
measures concessions received and given in "percentage-point dollars."  We see again a
very large variation in the "mercantilist balance" of concessions received over
concessions given.  Of thirty-three countries for which we have figures, twenty-three had
an imbalance - positive or negative - at least half as large as their concessions given.
18  Again, we found no evidence that any country had ever attempted to tabulate at any GATT round the
amount of concessions that it had received.  This fact certainly argues against the hypothesis as a
description of what negotiators actually do.
19  We took into account only concessions given to the countries in our sample -- concessions tabulated
over imports from these countries only.
15At the bottom of the table we provide two summary measures of this variation:
the sum of the absolute difference divided by the sum of concessions received, and the
overlap index. 20 The overlap index measures the percentage of the total number of two
different things that have "mates" when both items are distributed among the same
categories. For example, if one box contains one knife and nine forks, the other box
contains zero  knives and nine forks, then of the total of 19 forks and knives, only two
(one fork and one knife) have mates within their category, or box. 21 According to the
overlap index, only 29 percent of percentage point dollars of concessions given were
matched by concessions received by the same country.
FINAL REMARKS
Though it seems obvious that mercantilism (aversion to imports, attraction to
exports) provides the thrust for the GATT/WTO trade negotiations we found little
evidence that governments evaluate their own performance by a mercantilist standard of
export concessions received less import access concessions given.  None of the
delegations we interviewed were aware of such calculations, either by their own
governments or by others.  Likewise, we found that when measured by net concessions
received, the outcome of the negotiations varied enormously from one country to another.
While the process may be driven by the mercantilist instinct, there did seem to be
imposed on it a mercantilist sense of community, or equal sacrifice (import concessions)
for the common good.  Delegations emphasized that as the Round was coming to an end,
the standard of 1/3 cut by the developed countries, '/4  cut by the developing economies,
became an important yardstick.  This system of control is however, anything but precise.
Comceptually, the conversations and non-papers that demonstrate a concern for equal
sacrifice (tempered by ability of the developing countries to pay) did not go into how to
measure tariff cuts - e.g., dT/T or dt/(1+T) -how to balance off depth versus scope of cut,
or how to take into account that some countries started from different levels of protection
- e.g., it would be difficult for Hong Kong, China or Singapore to contribute to the tariff
cuts.  Empirically, the data a lot of variation from country to country in the depth and in
the scope of cuts.
We do however observe in the results indications that the developing countries
were given credit for binding under the WTO tariff cuts that had been made unilaterally,
and even for tariff cuts that were applied but not bound.  Bound cuts were more uniform
20 We did not calculate coefficients of variation because the expected value over all countries of
percentage point dollars of concessions received minus concessions given is zero.
21 The overlap index is by definition equal to 100 *  [2 * I  Min(Ri, Gi)] / I  (Ri + Gi).  Since the
total of percentage point dollars of concessions received and given are equal the overlap index for
those columnns  must be equal to ½ of the sum of the absolute differences divided by the total of
concessions received.
16than the cuts the developing countries added at the Uruguay Round, total cuts - that
included unbound cuts of applied rates - even more uniform than bound cuts.
Two other findings are also important, though we cannot fit them in to any
particular analytical model - except perhaps the obvious one of agents' self-interest:
*  delegations attended to their country's powerful constituencies - powerful
constituencies were attended to,
*  delegations avoided calculations that would allow a comparison of one delegation's
"score" with another's.
Table 1: Depth of Reciprocal Tariff Reductions Agreed at the Uruguay Round
by Selected Countries and Groups
Country or group  dT/Tb  dT/(l+Tb)  Indexa,  indexb
(as %)  (as %)  dT/T  dT/(l+T)
(a)  (b)  (c)  (d)
Australia  18.2  3.18  54  158
Austria  32.2  3.60  97  178
Canada  9.6  0.87  29  43
European Union  35.5  2.13  107  105
Finland  23.1  2.43  69  120
Japan  22.6  1.02  68  50
New Zealand  5.3  0.78  16  39
Norway  17.3  2.11  52  105
Sweden  29.3  1.48  88  73
Switzerland  27.8  0.89  84  44
United States  23.2  1.03  70  51
Target, industrial c's  33.3  2.03  100  100
Argentina  0.0  0.00  0  0
Brazil  0.0  0.00  0  0
Chile  0.0  0.00  0  0
Colombia  0.0  0.02  0  0
Czech & Slovak U.  19.8  0.98  79  20
Hong Kong  0.0  0.00  0  0
Hungary  16.7  1.69  67  34
Iceland  0.8  0.18  3  4
India  13.8  5.52  55  110
Indonesia  0.7  0.23  3  5
Korea Rep.  42.6  5.64  170  113
Malaysia  21.5  1.84  86  37
Mexico  0.0  0.00  0  0
17Country or group  dT/Tb  dT/(l+Tb)  Indexa,  Index
(as %)  (as %)  dT/T  dT/(l+T)
(a)  (b)  (c)  (d)
Peru  0.0  0.02  0  0
Philippines  5.0  1.22  20  24
Poland  10.9  1.26  44  25
Singapore  3.8  0.78  15  16
Sri Lanka  0.0  0.01  0  0
Thailand  17.1  5.29  68  106
Tunisia  0.0  0.02  0  0
Turkey  13.2  2.85  53  57
Uruguay  0.0  0.00  0  0
Venezuela  0.4  0.12  2  2
Target, developing c's  25  5.00  100  100
Notes, Table 1
a  Each country's tariff reduction as a percentage of the Uruguay Round informal targets
of 1/3 reduction by industrial countries and 1/4 reduction by other countries.
b Each country's  tariff reduction as a percentage of the target calculated as follows: (i)
The pre Uruguay Round average tariff for industrial countries and for developing
countries were 6.5 percent and 25 percent, respectively. A 1/3 reduction of the 6.5
percent rate comes to 2.03, when measured by dT/(l+T);  likewise a 1/4 reduction of the
25 percent rate comes to 5 percent when measured by dT/(l+T).  Consequently in this
column, 2.03 is the base for the index values for the industrial countries, 5 percent for the
index values for the developing countries.
18Table 2: Indices of Reciprocal, Bound and Total Tariff Reductions
Given at the Uruguay Round, by Selected Countries
Reciprocala  Boundb  Totalb
Industrial countriesc
Australia  54  125  195
Austria  97  105  98
Canada  29  152  152
European Union  107  132  132
Finland  69  69  na
Hong Kong  0  0  0
Iceland  2  77  77
Japan  68  203  209
New Zealand  16  174  225
Norway  52  132  132
Singapore  11  193  288
Sweden  88  114  na
Switzerland  84  98  98
United States  70  130  130
Czech & Slovak U  59  71  72
Hungary  50  77  84
Poland  33  122  152
Developing countriesd
Argentina  0  78  176
Brazil  0  114  282
Chile  0  113  273
Colombia  0  70  278
India  55  153  190
Indonesia  3  14  150
Korea Rep.  170  204  275
Malaysia  86  125  156
Mexico  0  93  298
Peru  0  76  184
Philippines  20  38  148
Sri Lanka  0  16  75
Thailand  68  77  240
Tunisia  0  14  55
Turkey  53  56  245
Uruguay  0  34  67
Venezuela  2  30  254
Stdev/Mean*lOe  ]  [_  T
19Reciprocala  B  ound  Total1
All countries  111  57  47
Industrial  countries  66  42  51
Developing  countries  168  67  39
Notes for Table 2
a Calculated  from average  tariff reductions  by the formula  dTIT 0, where  To  is the tariff
rate before the change.
b Calculated  from average  tariff reductions  by the formula  dT/Tavg,  where Tavg  is the
average  of the tariff rates before and after the change.
c  For industrial  countries,  the index  is based on the informally  presumed 1/3  overall
reduction.
d For developing  countries,  the index is based on the informally  presumed  1/4  overall
reduction.
'Calculation of these summary  statistics  did not include  Finland  and Sweden.
Table 3: Variation  among  countries  of tariff reductions  given at the Uruguay  Round,
reduction  measured  as dT/[l+(To+T 1)12]
Reciprocal  Bound  Total
i_______________  -reduction  reduction  reduction
All countriesa
Standard  deviation  1.79  4.61  8.24
Mean  1.44  I  5.68  I  11.50
Stdev/Mean*100  125  1  81  72
Standard  deviation  1.02  3.33  4.89
Mean  C  1.42  4.63  5.90
StdevlMean*100  72  72  83
Developinz  C'sa
Standard  deviation  2.27  5.34  7.39
Mean  1.46  6.59  16.45
Stdev/Mean*100  155  81  45
Notes for Table 1:
a The country  coverage  is the same as for Table 2.
20Table 4: Reciprocal tariff concessions received and given at the Uruguay Round
Percent tariff reductiona  Mercantilist balance, in
Per entage point dollarsb
Received  Given  Received  Concessions  Concessions  Received minus
minus Given  Received  Given  Given, as
percent of
Received
Australia  0.76  3.35  -2.59  21032  88162  -319
Austria  2.64  3.74  -1.11  74602  108820  46
Canada  0.22  0.  .9  :  -067  5291  . 6205  -395
European Union  1.94  2.19  -0.26  578816  627939  -8
Finland  3.47  2.52  0.95  63924  44021  31
Hong Kong  . - -2.36  - M.-  2.36  60258  0  - IOD
Iceland  1.59  0.20  1.39  2151  299  86
Japan  2.06  1.06  1.00  481006  143142  70
Nwxealand  . 0.84  0-3,  OI0  5126 ...  4155
Norway  1.15  2.17  -1.03  24250  44263  -83
Singapore  1.96  0.85  1.11  50294  32741  35
Sitizrland  Q21-5  0189125  106  .4  53
United States  1.21  1.07  0.14  214791  283580  -32
Czech & Slovak U  2,06  1.05  1.01  9773  7312  25
Hwgary  - 1-.82  - ,69..%  0.13  7755  13727  -77
Poland  1.36  1.26  0.09  8609  7112  17
Argentina c  0.98  0.00  0.98  6331  0  100
Brazil  1.37  0.00  1.36  38037  98  100
Cbile  c  -O50  0:00  0.50  3291  0  100
Colombia  1.25  0.02  1.23  6323  81  99
India  1.22  6,16  -4.94  14380  67172  -367
Indonesia  0,87  0.25  0.63.  16222  3355  79
Korea Rep.  1.87  5.99  4.12  100809  262918  -161
Malaysia  1.46  1.97  -0.51  36108  28966  20
Mexico  0.16  0o.  0.16  :  .-3  10
Peru  0.57  0.03  0.54  1586  58  96
Philippines  2.43  1.29  1.14  19748  12847  35
Srn Lanka  136  0X01  1.35-  159  33  98
Thailand  1.33  5.93  -4.60  20564  95953  -367
Tunisia  1.42  0.02  1.40  2506  72  97
Turkey  1.72  3.00  -1.27  :  1257  -32661  160
Uruguay  c  0.52  0.00  0.51  772  6  99
Venezuela  0.21  0.13  0.08  2051  806  61
Sum abs diff/ Sum of rec'vd, as  % = 137  Sum abs diff/ Sum of rec'vd, as %  58
Overlap index = 42  Overlap index = 29
Notes for table 4
a Weighted average of change measured as dT/(1 + Ta,d* 100, where Tavg  is the average of the before and after change
rates, calculated across all tariff lines, including those on which there was no reduction.
bTariff  cut as measured in the first or second column multiplied by the value (in millions of dollars) of the imports or
exports to which the importing country applies mfn tariff rates.
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